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Abstract
Survival function estimation is used in many disciplines, but it is most common in
medical analytics in the form of the Kaplan-Meier estimator. Sensitive data (patient
records) is used in the estimation without any explicit control on the information
leakage, which is a significant privacy concern. We propose a first differentially
private estimator of the survival function and show that it can be easily extended
to provide differentially private confidence intervals and test statistics without
spending any extra privacy budget. We further provide extensions for differentially
private estimation of the competing risk cumulative incidence function. Using nine
real-life clinical datasets, we provide empirical evidence that our proposed method
provides good utility while simultaneously providing strong privacy guarantees.
1 Introduction
A patient progresses from HIV infection to AIDS after 4.5 years. A study using the patient’s data
publishes the survival function estimates (a standard practice in clinical research). An adversary, with
only access to the published estimates (even in the form of survival function plots), can reconstruct
user-level data [1, 2]. Effectively leading to the disclosure of sensitive information. This is just one
scenario. The survival function is used for modeling any time to an event, taking into account that
some subjects will not experience the event at the time of data collection. The survival function is
used in many domains, some examples are the duration of unemployment (in economics); time until
the failure of a machine part (in engineering); time to disease recurrence, time to infection, time to
death (in healthcare); etc.
Our personal healthcare information is the most sensitive private attribute, protected by law, violations
of which carry severe penalties. And as the initial example suggests, of all application areas,
information leakage in the healthcare domain is the most serious issue and is our focus in this study.
For estimation of the survival function, we focus on the Kaplan-Meier’s (KM) [3] non-parametric
method. KM’s method is ubiquitous in clinical research. A quick search of the term on PubMed1
yields 109,421 results. It is not an overstatement to say that almost every clinical study uses KM’s
method to report summary statistics on their cohort’s survival. Statistical agencies around the world
use this method to report on the survival of the general population or specific disease-related survival
estimates.
To best of our knowledge, there does not exist any model that can provide formal privacy guarantees
for estimation of survival function using the KM method. The only related work is by Nguyên &
Hui [4], which uses the output and objective perturbation for regression modeling of discrete time
to event data. The approach is limited to “multivariate" regression models and cannot be directly
used to estimate survival function in a differentially private fashion. One can argue that generative
1A free search engine indexing manuscripts and abstracts for life sciences and other biomedical topics. Link -
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/
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models such as the differentially private generative adversarial networks [5, 6, 7, 8, 9] can be trained
to generate differentially private synthetic data. Which can then be used to estimate the survival
function. But, GANs do not generalize well to the datasets typically encountered for our use-case
(very small sample size (can be less than a hundred), highly constrained dimensionality (d ∈ [2, 3]), a
mixture of categorical and continuous variables, no data pre-processing allowed, etc.).
We propose the first differentially private method for estimating the survival function based on the
KM method. Grounded by the core principles of differential privacy, our method guarantees the
differentially private estimation of the survival function. Also, we show that our method easily
extends to provide differentially private confidence intervals and differentially private test statistics
(for comparison of survival function between multiple groups) without any extra privacy cost. We
further extend our method for differentially private estimation of the competing risk cumulative
incidence function (another popular estimate in clinical research). Using nine real-life clinical
datasets, we provide empirical evidence that our proposed method provides good utility while
simultaneously providing strong privacy guarantees. Lastly, we release our method as an R2 [10]
package for rapid accessibility and adoption.
2 Preliminaries and Technical Background
We use this section to introduce the concepts central to the understanding of our method.
2.1 Survival Function
The survival function is used to model time to event data, where the event may not have yet occurred
(but the probability of occurrence is non-zero). Such as for HIV infection to AIDS timeline data, at
the end of the follow-up period, some patients would have progressed (our event of interest), while
others would not have yet progressed (censored observations). Accounting for censored observations
(patients that never experience the event during our follow-up) is the central component in the
estimation of the survival function. Formally,
S(t) = P (T > t) =
∫ ∞
t
f(u) du = 1− F (t) (1)
this gives the probability of not having an event just before time t, or more generally, the probability
that the event of interest has not occurred by time t.
In practice, survival function can be estimated using more than one approach. Several parametric
methods (that make assumptions on the distribution of survival times) such as the ones based on
the exponential, Weibull, Gompertz, and log-normal distributions are available. Or one can opt for
the most famous and most often used non-parametric method (Kaplan-Meier’s method [3]), which
does not assume how the probability of an event changes over time. Our focus in this paper is the
latter, which has become synonymous with survival models in clinical literature. KM estimator of the
survival function is defined as follows
Sˆ(t) =
∏
j:tj≤t
rj − dj
rj
(2)
where tj , (j ∈ 1, · · · , k) is the set of k distinct failure times (not censored), dj is the number of
failures at tj , and rj are the number of individuals “at risk" before the j-th failure time. We can see
that the function Sˆ(t) only changes at each failure time, not for censored observations, resulting in a
“step" function (the characteristic feature of KM estimate).
2.2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [11] provides provable privacy notion, with the intuition that a randomized
algorithm behaves similarly on similar input datasets. Formally,
Definition 1. (Differential privacy [11]) A randomized algorithmM with domain N|X | preserves
(, δ)-differentially privacy if for all S ⊆ Range(M) and for all x, y ∈ N|X | such that ||x− y||1 ≤ 1,
we have
Pr[M(x) ∈ S] ≤ ePr[M(y) ∈ S] + δ (3)
2Most often used programming language in medical statistics
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where the two datasets (x, y) only differ in any one row (neighboring datasets) and the probability
space is over the coin flips of the mechanismM. If δ = 0, we have “pure -differential privacy".
Smaller (, δ) provide stronger privacy guarantees.
Differential privacy has some interesting properties. We briefly introduce the main property that
is crucial to our proposal of differentially private survival function estimation. That is, the post-
processing, formally
Theorem 1. (Post processing [11]) LetM : N|X | → R be a randomized algorithm that is (, δ)-
differentially private. Let f : R→ R′ be an arbitrary randomized mapping. Then f ◦M : N|X | → R′
is (, δ)-differentially private.
Theorem 1 states that differential privacy is immune to post-processing. That is, an adversary acting
only on the output ofM, cannot increase the privacy loss. This notion is central to our approach and
we will revisit it in the following sections.
3 Differentially Private Estimation of Survival Function
Now we introduce our method for differentially private estimation of the survival function using the
Kaplan-Meier’s method. We follow the basic principles of differential privacy to ensure that our
estimate of the survival function is differentially private. We subsequently show that following our
simple approach, it is possible to estimate a wide variety of accompanying statistics (such as the
confidence intervals, comparison test statistics, etc.) in a differentially private way without spending
any extra privacy budget.
3.1 Estimation
Before we begin, we recap some of the notations introduced in Section 2.1. We have a vector of time
points (tj , j ∈ {1, · · · , k}), and for each time point, we have a corresponding number of subjects at
risk rj (number of subjects not experiencing a progression up to that time point), and we have the
number of subjects experiencing the event at that time point (number of progressions), which we
denote as dj .
We first create a dataset (a matrix) where each row has the data on the number of events (dj) and the
number at risk (rj) for each unique time point (tj). Let’s denote this matrix by M . Then using the
L1 sensitivity (S) of M , we draw a noise matrix Z from the Laplace distribution (Lap(S/)), where
 is the privacy parameter and Z is of the same size as M . We then create a differentially private
version of M by adding Z, that is, M ′ = M +Z. All subsequent calculations use M ′. We succinctly
present our method as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Differentially Private Estimation of Sˆ(t)
1: procedure DP(Sˆ(t))
2: Create a matrix M ; [rj , dj ] ∈M ; for every tj
3: M ′ = M + Lap(S/); [r′j , d
′
j ] ∈M ′
4: Sˆ′(t) =
∏
j:tj≤t
r′j−d′j
r′j
5: return Sˆ′(t)
We use this paragraph to briefly discuss Algorithm 1. We begin with the noticeable simplicity of
the procedure, that is, the minimal changes required to the original estimation procedure to make
it differentially private. This further boosts the accessibility of our differentially private version (it
can be implemented using any readily available software package). Also, the required changes for
differential privacy come with no computational overhead compared to the original estimation (our
method is computationally cheap). Below we provide the formal privacy guarantees and further
details on how this method can be easily extended for differentially private estimation of “other"
associated statistics.
3
3.2 Privacy Guarantees
Now we are ready to formally state the differential privacy guarantees of our proposed method.
Before we state our main theorem, we start with a supporting Lemma for establishing the global L1
sensitivity (S) of our method.
Lemma 1. L1 sensitivity (S) of M is two.
Proof. As M only contains count variables for the number of events and number at risk for each
unique time point. Adding or removing any single individual can change the counts by at most two
(that is being in at-risk group and having an event).
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 is -differentially private.
Proof. Sketch: We have established the L1 sensitivity of M . Using it to add Laplace noise (M ′ =
M + Lap(2/)) makes sure M ′ is differentially private and so are its individual components (that are
r′j , d
′
j). Using (r
′
j , d
′
j) to calculate the survival function (Eqn. 2) ensures that the estimated function
is differentially private by the post-processing theorem [12]. Complete formal proof is provided in
the Appendix.
4 Extending to Other Estimates
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the advantages of our approach is its easy extension to other
essential statistics often required and reported along with the estimates of the survival function. Such
as the confidence intervals, test statistics for comparing the survival function distributions, etc. Here
we formally define the extensions with their privacy guarantees.
4.1 Confidence Intervals and Test Statistics
When reporting survival function estimates, it is often required to include the related confidence
intervals, reported to reflect the uncertainty of the estimate. And for group comparison, such as
comparing the infection rates between two treatment arms of a clinical trial, hypothesis testing is
used with the help of test statistic. So, it is of paramount interest to provide the differentially private
counterparts of both (confidence intervals and test statistics). We start with the confidence intervals.
Confidence Intervals for survival function estimates are calculated in a “point-wise" fashion, that is,
they are calculated at discrete time-points whenever an event is observed (for the same time points at
which the survival function changes its value). We start with proving that the calculations required
for obtaining confidence intervals are differentially private following the changes made to the data in
Algorithm 1.
Theorem 3. Confidence Intervals for Sˆ′(t) are -differentially private.
Proof. There are more than one type of confidence intervals available for the survival function. Here
we focus on the most often used Greenwood’s [13] linear-point-wise confidence intervals.
Greenwood’s formula for the confidence intervals is given as
Sˆ(t)± z1−α/2σS(t) (4)
where
σ2s(t) = Vˆ [Sˆ(t)] (5)
and
Vˆ [Sˆ(t)] = Sˆ(t)2
∑
tj≤t
dj
rj(rj − dj) (6)
Replacing by their respective differentially private counterparts from Algorithm 1.
Vˆ ′[Sˆ(t)] = Sˆ′(t)2
∑
tj≤t
d′j
r′j(r
′
j − d′j)
(7)
estimate for Vˆ ′[Sˆ(t)] is now differentially private, using it in conjunction with Sˆ′(t) makes the
confidence intervals differentially private by the post-processing theorem [11].
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As we don’t need any additional access to the sensitive data for calculating confidence intervals.
Hence, calculating and providing differentially private confidence intervals with the differentially
private survival function estimates does not incur any additional privacy cost. In other words, we get
the differentially private confidence intervals for free.
Hypothesis tests are often used to compare the distribution of survival function estimates between
groups. For example: To compare infection rates between two treatment arms of a clinical trial. Most
often used statistical test in such scenarios is the Logrank test [14]. Below we show that using our
method (Algorithm 6), the hypothesis testing using the Logrank test is differentially private.
Theorem 4. Hypothesis test for Sˆ′(t) is -differentially private.
Proof. Logrank test statistic (Z) is given as
Z =
∑k
j=1(O1j − E1j)√∑k
j=1 Vj
(8)
where O1j are observed number of failures (events) (d1j) and E1j are the expected number of failures
at time j in group 1, we have
E1j = dj
r1j
rj
(9)
and Vj is the variance, given as
Vj =
r1jr2jdj(rj − dj)
r2j (rj − 1)
(10)
Replacing the corresponding quantities by their differentially private counterparts using Algorithm 1,
we get
V ′j =
r′1jr
′
2jd
′
j(r
′
j − d′j)
r′2j (r
′
j − 1)
(11)
which makes V ′j differentially private as no other sensitive information is required for its estimation.
Using it in conjunction withO1j andE1j , which can be made differentially private following the same
argument, makes the test statistic Z differentially private by the post-processing theorem [11].
The calculation, again being the case of standard post-processing on differentially private data does
not add to our overall privacy budget. Hence, after using Algorithm 1, we can output the related
confidence intervals and the test statistic without spending any additional privacy budget.
4.2 Extending to Competing Risks (Cumulative Incidence)
In certain scenarios, we can have more than one type of event. Using our prior example of HIV
infection, we might have a scenario where patients die before progression to AIDS, making the
observation of progression impossible. Such events (death) that preclude any possibility of our event
of interest (progression) are known as competing events. Competing events are a frequent occurrence
in clinical data and require specialized estimates that take this phenomenon into account, without
which our estimates will be biased. One such estimate is the competing risk cumulative incidence,
which is also the most widely used and reported estimate in the literature, akin to the KM estimate,
but for competing events.
Here we show that using Algorithm 1, we can easily extend differential privacy to competing risk
scenarios.
Theorem 5. Competing risk cumulative incidence using our method is -differentially private.
Proof. Cumulative incidence extends Kaplan-Meier estimator and is given by
Iˆj(t) =
∑
i:ti<t
Sˆ(ti)
dij
ni
(12)
where dij is the number of events of type j at time t(i) and Sˆ(ti) is the standard Kaplan-Meier
estimator at time t(i).
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Replacing associated quantities with their differentially private counterparts (using same reasoning as
Algorithm 1).
Iˆj(t)
′ =
∑
i:ti<t
Sˆ(ti)
′ d
′
ij
n′i
(13)
Its not hard to see that Iˆj(t)′ is differentially private by the post-processing theorem.
4.3 More Extensions
Further statistics associated with the cumulative incidence such as the confidence intervals and
hypothesis tests, hazard function and hazard ratios, etc. that directly depend on the quantities made
differentially private using Algorithm 1 can be similarly argued to be differentially private. Another
popular extension that we easily get from our method is the differentially private version of the
Nelson-Aalen estimate of the cumulative hazard [15, 16, 17]. Which is simply Hˆ ′(t) =
∑
tj≤t d
′
j/r
′
j
, or can be estimated directly from its relationship with the survival function (Sˆ′(t) = exp(−Hˆ ′(t))).
5 Empirical Evaluation
Here we present the empirical evaluation of our method on nine real-life clinical datasets of varying
properties. We start with the dataset description.
5.1 Datasets
Nine real-life clinical datasets with time to event information are used to evaluate our proposed method.
Dataset details are provided in Table 1. For space constraints, we provide further details (dataset
properties, pre-processing, group comparison details for hypothesis tests, etc.) in the Appendix.
Table 1: Datasets used for evaluation of our proposed method, observations are the number of
observations (rows) in the dataset. Wide variety of datasets are used to simulate real-world clinical
scenarios.
Dataset Observations
Cancer 228
Gehan 42
Kidney 76
Leukemia 23
Mgus 1384
Myeloid 646
Ovarian 26
Stanford 184
Veteran 137
5.2 Setup and Comparison
Privacy budget () is varied as reported in the results. Being a “non-trainable" model, there are
no train/test splits and results are reported on the complete dataset as an average of ten runs. All
experiments are performed in R [10] with the source code and the datasets made publicly available
on GitHub and as an R package3.
As there is no current method for producing differentially private estimates of the survival function.
We compare our approach to the original “non-private" version. This provides us with a comparison
to the upper bound (we cannot get better than the non-noisy version). Good utility in comparison with
the original non-perturbed version will add credibility to our claim of high utility and will encourage
practitioners to adopt our method for practical use.
3Available on https://bit.ly/2kNHC1J
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5.3 Results
Now we present the outcome of our evaluation on nine real-life datasets. We start with the estimation
of the differentially private survival function and then move on to the evaluation of the extensions
(confidence intervals, test statistic, etc.).
5.3.1 Main Results
For the differentially private estimation of the survival function (our primary goal), Figure 1 shows the
results. We can see that our privacy-preserving estimation (green line) faithfully estimates the survival
function (black line), with little utility loss. As expected, estimation deteriorates with increased
privacy budget (orange line).
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Figure 1: Differentially private estimation of the survival function: Followup time is on the X-axis
and the probability of survival is on the Y-axis. The black line is the original function estimate, the
green line is the differentially private estimate with  = 2, and the orange line is the differentially
private estimate with  = 1. We observe that our method provides good utility while protecting an
individual’s privacy. Small sample sized datasets fare worse compared to larger datasets.
An observation worth making is that as the dataset size gets smaller (a small number of events; as
in ovarian, Leukemia, Gehan), the utility of our differentially private estimation gets worse. Which
is intuitive from the differential privacy point of view, because to protect an individual’s privacy
in a small dataset, we will need to add large noise (large perturbation). Whereas for moderate to
medium-sized datasets, our differentially private estimation provides good results, even for the high
privacy regime.
5.3.2 Median Survival, Confidence Intervals, Test Statistic, and Cumulative Incidence
An important estimate often reported with survival function is the median survival time and its
associated confidence intervals. Median survival time is defined as the time point when the survival
function attains the value of 0.5, confidence intervals for the survival function at that time point serve
as the confidence intervals of the median survival. Table 2 shows the results. For “Median Survival
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(95% CI)", we see that our method estimates the median with high precision, even for high privacy
regime. For some cases due to high survival (as is the case with Myeloid and Ovarian datasets), it is
not possible to estimate the upper bounds on the confidence intervals, that is why they are marked
as “NA". We see a similar trend as we saw with results in Figure 1, our precision increases with
increasing dataset size, an acceptable trade-off for individual-level privacy protection.
Table 2: Median Survival with associated confidence intervals and the test statistic for comparing two
survival distributions.  is the privacy budget for our method and “No privacy" are the results from
the non-noisy model. Our method provides “close" estimates to the original non-noisy values.
Median Survival(95% CI) Test Statistic (Z)
Dataset  = 2  = 1 NoPrivacy  = 2  = 1
No
Privacy
Cancer 9.3 (7.4, 10.2) 7.6 (7.0, 8.9) 10.2 (9.4, 11.9) 12.8 13.6 11.4
Gehan 10.0 (6.0, 15.0) 7.0 (4.0, 11.0) 12.0 (8.0, 22.0) 17.1 27.4 16.3
Kidney 2.1 (1.3, 4.3) 1.7 (1.0, 3.9) 2.6 (1.3, 5.0) 12.1 27.8 7.0
Leukemia 0.6 (0.2, 0.9) 0.3 (0.1, 0.9) 0.9 (0.6, 1.5) 4.1 4.4 3.6
Mgus 3.2 (3.0, 3.4) 3.0 (2.9, 3.3) 3.2 (3.0, 3.4) 5.9 4.8 7.6
Myeloid 27.5 (22.9, NA) 17.3 (16.3, NA) 40.1 (27.1, NA) 11.3 15.6 8.7
Ovarian 15.2 (14.2, NA) 11.9 (8.8, NA) 21.0 (15.2, NA) 2.1 6.5 1.1
Stanford 20.7 (8.6, 30.5) 9.2 (6.3, 10.8) 20.7 (10.8, 40.5) 5.9 7.7 5.6
Veteran 2.6 (1.8, 3.4) 1.7 (1.1, 1.8) 2.6 (1.7, 3.5) 1.0 3.4 0.02
For the test statistic4, in Table 2, we observe that our differentially private estimation performs at
par with the original “non-noisy" estimation, even for the high privacy regime. The test statistic (Z)
follows the χ2 distribution with one degree of freedom. Using it to derive the p-values, we observe
that none of the differentially private estimates change statistical significance threshold (at 0.05 level).
That is, none of the differentially private estimates make the “non-noisy" statistically significant
results non-significant or vice-versa.
For cumulative incidence, we use two new datasets with competing risk information. Results are
similar with the estimation of competing risk cumulative incidence, that is, our proposed method
provides good utility while protecting an individual’s privacy. Our method provides faithful estimation
even at high privacy regime. For space constraints, detailed results are presented in the Appendix.
6 Related Work
Much work has been done in the intersection of statistical modeling and differential privacy, including
many works proposing different differentially private methods for regression modeling [18, 19, 20,
21, 22]. Using the same principles, [4] further developed a differentially private regression model for
survival analysis. This approach is limited to the “multivariate" regression models and cannot be used
for direct differentially private estimation of the survival function. Differentially private generative
models such as the differentially private generative adversarial networks [5, 6, 7, 8, 9] have been
recently proposed. But, as discussed in the introduction, they are not suitable for generating data for
survival function estimation.
7 Conclusion
We have presented the first method for differentially private estimation of the survival function and
we have shown that our proposed method can be easily extended to differentially private estimation
of “other" often used statistics such as the associated confidence intervals, test statistics, and the
competing risk cumulative incidence. With extensive empirical evaluation on nine real-life datasets,
we have shown that our proposed method provides good privacy-utility trade-off.
4Obtained from comparing the survival distribution of different groups in the dataset, group details are
provided in the Appendix.
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A Appendix
A.1 Dataset Details
Here we provide details on the datasets used for evaluation.
1. Cancer: It pertains to the data on survival in patients with advanced lung cancer from the
North Central Cancer Treatment Group [23]. Survival time in days is converted into months.
Groups compared are males and females.
2. Gehan: This is the dataset from a trial of 42 leukemia patients [24]. Groups compared are
the control and treatment groups.
3. Kidney: This dataset is on the recurrence times to infection, at the point of insertion of the
catheter, for kidney patients using portable dialysis equipment [25]. Time is converted into
months and groups compared are males and females.
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4. Leukemia: This pertains to survival in patients with Acute Myelogenous Leukemia [26].
Time is converted into months and groups compared are whether maintenance chemotherapy
was given or not.
5. Mgus: This dataset is about natural history of subjects with monoclonal gammopathy
of undetermined significance (MGUS) [27]. Time is converted into months and groups
compared are males and females.
6. Myeloid: Dataset is based on a trial in acute myeloid leukemia. Time is converted into
months and groups compared are the two treatment arms.
7. Ovarian: This dataset pertains to survival in a randomized trial comparing two treatments for
ovarian cancer [28]. Time is converted into months and groups compared are the different
treatment groups.
8. Stanford: This dataset contains the Stanford Heart Transplant data [29]. Time is converted
into months and groups compared are the age groups (above and below median).
9. Veteran: This dataset has information from randomized trial of two treatment regimens for
lung cancer [30]. Time is converted into months and groups compared are the treatment
arms.
A.2 Extending to Competing Risk (Cumulative Incidence)
For empirical evaluation in a competing risk scenario, we use two datasets that have more than one
type of event. First is from a clinical trial for primary biliary cirrhosis (PBC) of the liver [31]. With
the event variable being receipt of a liver transplant, censor, or death; our event of interest is the
transplant, and death here is a competing event. The second dataset has the data on the subjects on a
liver transplant waiting list from 1990-1999, and their disposition: received a transplant (event of
interest), died while waiting (competing risk), or censored [32].
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Figure 2: Extending differentially private estimation to competing risk cumulative incidence (cumu-
lative incidence is the opposite of survival function, so the plots go upward). Black is the original,
unperturbed estimate. Green is with  = 2 and orange is with  = 1. We can see that our method
does a good job of estimating competing risk cumulative incidence while providing strong privacy
guarantees.
Figure 2 shows the results (cumulative incidence is the opposite of survival function, so the plots go
upward). We observe that our differentially private extension does an excellent job of differentially
private estimation of the competing risk cumulative incidence function while providing strong privacy
guarantees.
A.3 Proofs
Theorem 6. Algorithm 1 is -differentially private.
Proof. Let M ∈ Rd and M∗ ∈ Rd, such that the L1 sensitivity, S, is ||M − M∗||1 ≤ 1, and
let f(.) denote some function, f : Rd → Rk. Let pM denote the probability density function of
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Z(M,f, ), and let pM∗ denote the probability density function of Z(M∗, f, ), we compare both at
some arbitrary point q ∈ Rk.
pM (q)
pM∗(q)
=
k∏
i=1
(
exp(− |f(M)i−qi|∆f )
exp(− |f(M∗)i−qi|∆f )
)
=
k∏
i=1
exp
(
(|f(M∗)i − qi| − |f(M)i − qi|)
∆f
)
≤
k∏
i=1
exp
(
|f(M)i − f(M∗)i|
∆f
)
= exp
(
||f(M)− f(M∗)||1
∆f
)
≤ exp()
(14)
last inequality follows from the definition of sensitivity S
As our function estimation uses everything from M ′ (our differentially private version of M ) and
nothing else from the sensitive data, our survival function estimation is differentially private by the
post-processing Theorem [12].
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